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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the channels through which macroeconomic instability prevents or hinders innovative 
investment undertakings financed by the domestic private sector. The analysis is based on a sample of 48 
countries, representing all levels of development, and it estimates various measures of macroeconomic 
instability, such as political, real and monetary volatility. The results suggest a negative impact of instability 
on the share of R&D financed by the business sector. These outcomes highlight the desirability of counter-
cyclical policy interventions aiming to prevent the avoidance or abandonment of private R&D undertakings 
in unstable macroeconomic environments. 
Keywords: Macroeconomic Volatility, Political Instability, R&D Investment, Innovation. 
JEL Classification: C33, O11, O31, O33 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Small, credit-constrained firms and, in general, all enterprises that for the nature of their business 
are exposed to the negative impact of macroeconomic instability may see their incentive to invest 
in costly innovation projects vanish in the face of uncertainty.  In this respect, it is often argued that 
                                            
1 I am grateful to Kyriakos Neanidis for detailed feedback; to Martyn Andrews and Arthur Sinko for technical feedback; 
to Edmund Amann, James Bank and David Chivers for helpful discussion. I also thank for their comments and 
suggestions the participants to the 16th ICMAIF Conference (University of Crete) and the participants to the ED 
Conference and Development Seminar Series 2012 (University of Manchester). 
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adequate levels of tangible and intangible infrastructure are key to the development of a thriving 
entrepreneurial sector, in that they provide the basic support for firms to progress past the start-up 
phase. This paper argues that in uncertain environments not only the level of infrastructural support 
is important but also its timing. In other words, if one is willing to agree on innovation being 
crucial to the generation of competitive advantage, counter-cyclical technology policies need to be 
implemented to maintain the private sector’s incentive to innovate, in the face of uncertainty. More 
concretely, when exploring the summary statistics (see Table 1 below) for the data used in this 
analysis, it is apparent that, with few exceptions, developed countries’ share of public R&D is 
lower than (or just as big as) the private share; whereas in developing countries (often very) low 
levels of business spending in R&D are accompanied by higher levels of government spending.
2
  
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
This inevitably raises the question of why the domestic private sector refrains from engaging in 
high-return R&D activities, despite the fact that a higher public effort in the provision of 
infrastructural support and background takes place. While a number of explanations have been 
related to structural and historical factors, this paper seeks to answer that question from a different 
point of view, by bearing in mind two extrinsic characteristics of R&D investment. Firstly, 
innovation is a risky, long-term maturity, high-budget type of investment (Katz, 1987). Secondly, 
small and medium-sized firms, particularly in developing countries, are often credit-constrained, 
especially during recessions (Aghion et al., 2010). Based on this evidence, it is straightforward to 
hypothesise that R&D may therefore be largely influenced by uncertainty in the surrounding 
environment, and that firms’ undertakings of costly and/or risky innovative plans are likely to be 
                                            
2 China, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Uruguay and Venezuela present some peculiarities, the discussion of 
which, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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hindered in uncertain macro-environments. These claims are supported by the findings of my 
empirical analysis for the country sample considered. The identification of the most appropriate 
policy tools to tackle these challenges is beyond the scope of this paper and a separate literature 
exists concerning the issue. What is being argued on the basis of this paper’s findings is that 
appropriate technology policies should aim to prevent the abandonment and/or avoidance of R&D 
undertakings as a consequence of uncertainty. The adoption of a counter-cyclical approach can 
smooth out negative phases so as to allow for continuity of private profitability horizons. 
 
In terms of the contribution of this paper: a number of studies have previously dealt with the 
implications of macroeconomic fluctuations on macro-performance,
3
 however, some adopted a 
more general focus on the effects of volatility on overall private investment, with conflicting results 
(Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983; Dehn, 2000; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; Bernanke, 1980; Federer, 
1993; Serven, 2003, Aghion et al., 2010). But only a few looked at the specific link between 
downturns and innovative private investment, in the form of R&D expenditure (Aghion and Saint-
Paul, 1998; Goel and Ram, 1999; Saint-Paul, 2003; Rafferty, 2003a; Barlevy, 2005; Aghion et al., 
2008; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009). Conflicting results arise in this sub-set 
of the literature too. In addition, all these papers take into account specifically the impact of 
recessions and crises on private R&D; but not on the impact of volatility in the occurrence of such 
crises, which is instead the focus of the present study. On the other hand, due to scarcity of 
developing country secondary data on innovation (Goel and Ram, 1999; Aghion et al., 2010; 
Agénor and Neanidis, 2011), most empirical studies take up a microeconometric approach, using 
firm-level data or examining OECD-based firms only. This paper adopts, instead, a 
macroeconometric approach. Further to this, an additional contribution is the construction of a 
                                            
3 Uncertainty and volatility are technically defined as two different concepts. However, it is common to find them used 
interchangeably in the literature and we will follow this convention hereafter. 
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comprehensive mixed dataset that includes both developed and developing countries.
4
 Finally, a 
multi-dimensional set of volatility indices is estimated. Specifically, to detangle the 
contemporaneous aspects in which instability of the macroeconomic environment manifests itself, I 
utilise a number of proxies for real, monetary and political instability and estimate a separate 
specific impact for each one of those. All are shown to bear an individual negative impact on 
private innovation incentives, which still holds even when all other dimensions of instability are 
included in the estimation at the same time. 
 
        The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines a brief theoretical background. 
Section 3 presents model, variables and data. The results along with the robustness analysis are 
described in section 4 and 5. Section 6 illustrates some policy implications and concludes. Finally, 
data sources, country list and all methodological considerations appear in Appendix A and B. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
The theoretical literature on uncertainty and investment can be broadly divided into two strands. 
Some studies describe the relationship between these two variables as positive (Hartman, 1972; 
Abel, 1983; Dehn, 2000; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993). Others posit that tighter credit constraints 
during recessions and the irreversibility of investment projects - especially of innovative 
investment - turn this relationship negative (Bernanke, 1980; Federer, 1993; Goel and Ram, 1999; 
Aghion et al., 2010).
5
 In particular, Bernanke (1980) argues that a range of inaction is created in the 
                                            
4 Details of the dataset composition process are presented in Section 2 below. 
5 Uncertainty is defined as an increase in the variance of future return forecasts. The latter is higher when the future 
maturity horizon of an investment is long and/or uncertain, which is particularly the case in R&D investments. 
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presence of uncertainty, and that investment will not be undertaken until the moment when the cost 
of postponing it exceeds the value of the information gained by waiting. Goel and Ram (1999) 
show that the impact of uncertainty is much larger on R&D investment. This is because the latter is 
highly irreversible due to its large share of expenditure on personnel and equipment which is 
project-specific and not merely firm-specific or industry-specific in nature. Aghion et al. (2010) 
find that, when credit markets are imperfect and liquidity constraints are tight enough, long-term 
investment will tend to be pro-cyclical.
6
  Other contributions place themselves somewhere in the 
middle: for instance, Sarkar (in Serven, 2003) maintains the link between volatility and investment 
exhibits threshold effects, with a positive relationship occurring at low uncertainty levels and a 
negative relationship taking place when the uncertainty rises beyond a critical threshold.  
 
       A more recent number of contributions analyses the impact of the business cycle on 
‘innovative’ investment. While this literature can provide some useful insights for the objectives of 
this paper, it has to be said that its specific focus overlooks the second moment of the business 
cycles, that is, its volatility, and concentrates on the analysis of the troughs only. This literature can 
again be divided into two main strands, depending on whether they maintain that R&D investment 
follows a pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical response pattern to macroeconomic fluctuations. Those 
that argue in favor of the first maintain that a ‘cash-flow’ effect exists, which financially constrains 
firms’ activities and hinders the undertaking of innovative investment during downturns (Rafferty, 
2003a; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Aghion et al., 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009, Aghion et al., 
2010). Barlevy (2005) adds to this that, although credit constraints account for part of the pro-
cyclicality, knowledge spillover effects play their part too. In particular, diffusion and 
                                                                                                                                            
Furthermore, investing in the proximity of the technological frontier requires plenty of funds and firms worry equally 
about probability of success and size of the investment (Canitrot, in Katz, 1987). 
6 The authors explicitly identify R&D investment as a long-term type of investment. 
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implementation by imitators tends to takes place during recessions when the time to reverse 
engineer the spilled-over idea before the next boom is longer. Therefore, private innovators will 
refrain from incurring spillover risks and will tend to invest in R&D during booms instead. Those 
that support the counter-cyclicality of R&D investment, instead, suggest that downturns influence 
resource allocation at the firm level according to ‘opportunity-cost’ criteria (see Saint-Paul, 1993). 
Specifically, recessions lower expected sales; as a consequence, the opportunity cost of undertaking 
R&D activities, in terms of foregone profits, is lowered as well in recessions. Therefore, firms will 
find it profitable to allocate resources to R&D during recessions and to the shop-floor during 
expansions. This approach is informed by the Schumpeterian view of the business cycle and by 
Hall’s reorganizational capital theory (1991). According to both, recessions have a cleansing role 
as they encourage firms to restructure, replace and innovate. Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), 
however, specify that such set-up only holds if innovation costs are not very high s to interfere with 
current production activities, in which case innovation will be pro-cyclical. Along the same line, 
Aghion et al. (2008) and Rafferty and Funk (2008) show that the existence of an asymmetry in 
binding constraints causes cash-flow constraint effect to bind more during recessions than 
expansions. This results in firms’ disinvestment during recessions being greater than their increase 
in investment during expansions. Likewise, the ‘opportunity-cost’ effect is shown to bind more 
during booms than slumps. As a result, firms tend to relocate resources away from R&D and 
towards the productive compartment when positive demand shocks occur, but the opposite is 
unlikely to happen (to the same extent), during negative demand shocks.  Relying on the same 
methodology used by Aghion et al. (2008), Bohva-Padilla et al. (2009) show that both pro and 
counter-cyclicality of R&D are confirmed. The first, however, is more likely to hold for small and 
medium-sized firms, which tend to experience binding credit constraints the most; whereas, the 
second characterises non-credit constrained firms only, such as MNCs or subsidised firms.  
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3. DATA AND MODEL 
 
The dataset used for this analysis has been constructed by merging various databases reporting 
measures of business R&D for both developed and developing countries (OECD STI, UNESCO 
S&T, RICYT – see Appendix A for details). 7 The panel covers 15 years, from 1994 to 2008, and 
the baseline sample includes 956 observations. Due to missing data, however, the actual estimated 
panel is reduced to 48 countries and 288 observations. Sub-Saharan African countries, excluding 
Uganda and South Africa, do not collect secondary data on innovation at all. Therefore, the panel 
suffers from an underrepresentation of African countries that needs to be acknowledged. All the 
sources used for the collection of the dataset and the country list are shown in Appendix A. The 
choice of regressors included in the model specification has taken into account and sought 
comparison with a variety of stability/instability indicators used in the literature, and it also 
includes various control variables which have been used by the literature on the determinants of 
innovative investment. The benchmark econometric specification is as follows: 
 
          ∑          ∑        ∑            
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
(1) 
 
                                            
7 Correspondence of measurement units has been ensured and discrepancies have been solved prior to the dataset merge. 
This has been achieved by making sure the overlapping sections of the various databases were rebased in the currency 
denomination year of the one that contained the most variables. Moreover, the unit of measurement has been 
homogenized across the various sources and million dollars have been used as the base unit. Finally, where data 
discrepancies were encountered, the formally identical data definition has been explored in detail to subtract the 
components which made measures different in practice.  
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where the dependent variable, yit, is BusinessR&D, the share of investment in R&D financed by the 
domestic business sector, calculated as a % of GDP. The right hand side of the regression includes 
a vector of time-invariant country fixed effects, αi, a vector of time-varying common effects, δt,, 
and the error component εit. The Xj,it-2 and Ζl,it vectors contain, respectively, lagged endogenous 
control variables and exogenous control variables in levels. These represent standard R&D 
investment determinants commonly used in the literature surrounding the micro and 
macroeconomic determinants of innovation. Finally, the vector of Vm,it is formed by volatility 
measures, the impact of which is the object of this analysis.  
 
I estimate a simple Fixed Effects (FE) model first, and then a 2SLS-FE model, which constitutes 
the preferred estimation set. The FE model only deals with time invariant country specific fixed 
effects and, in that context, I take care of the endogeneity of the Xj,it-2 vector variables by lagging 
(second lag) all the variable contained in the vector. However, as explained in Pesaran (2004) and 
Baltagi (2005), in this context, cross sectional dependence can be a problem. If such cross-sectional 
dependence is caused by the presence of common factors, which are unobserved but uncorrelated 
with the included regressors, then the standard FE estimator is consistent. However, if the 
unobserved components that create interdependencies across cross-sections are correlated with the 
included regressors, the FE estimators will be biased and inconsistent  A solution is the estimation 
of IV FEs, that is, two stage least squares with FE (2SLS-FE), provided there is not an issue of 
weak identification (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). When estimating 2SLS, the entire set of 
exogenous (or internal) instruments - the lags of the endogenous variables - is used to proxy for the 
whole set of endogenous variables. Whereas all the exogenous variables, contained in this case in 
vector Zl,it,  are used as instruments for themselves (external instruments). 
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Domestic private R&D spending has been chosen as the dependent variable to examine whether 
recurrent economy-wide fluctuations affect the incentive and willingness of the private sector to 
invest in innovation. As discussed previously and as visible in Table 1, developing countries suffer 
from lack of innovative entrepreneurial undertakings, in absolute terms, but especially when these 
are compared to the relative share of innovation carried out by the public sector. The latter has 
therefore been included in the regression specification, in the Xj,it-2 vector. To be more specific, the 
share of publicly financed R&D, GoverR&D, is included to account for the role of public tangible 
and intangible infrastructure and to verify whether its impact on private R&D spending has a 
complementary or crowding out effect. As public and private R&D can be co-determined, 
GoverR&D enters the regression in the form of its second lag. The same applies to all the other 
variables contained in Xj,it-2.The other variables included in this vector are LogGDP, that is, GDP 
per capita (in logs), and its interaction with the dummy HI.
8
 This takes the value of 1 if the country 
is a high-income country and zero otherwise.
9
 GDP per capita is included to control for the level of 
development of the countries in the panel. Its interaction term, LogGDPhi, on the other hand, has 
been included to control for the possible non-linearity of the relationship between the level of 
development of an economy and its private innovative spending.
10
  
 
                                            
8 The relevance of human capital and educational levels for the innovation process has been highlighted by both theory 
(Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) and empirics (Wang, 2010). The reason 
why such variable is excluded from this analysis is because of its very high correlation with GDP. 
9 According to the World Bank Atlas classification system. The list of HI countries is available in Appendix A 
10 The hypothesis of a non-linear pattern is confirmed by a visual inspection of the data and by a plot of LogGDPt-2 
against BusinessR&D. The plot suggests that the positive effect of the level of development on private innovation sets in 
after a certain income threshold and only exists in HI countries.  
10 
 
        The Zl,it vector contains exogenous control variables which represent commonly used 
determinants of private R&D spending. One of these is the real interest rate, IntRate
11
. The use of 
the latter as a determinant of investment is common (Rafferty, 2003b; Aghion et al., 2008; Rafferty 
and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009; Becker and Pain, 2003; Escaleras&Thomakos, 2008). 
The interest rate considered is the lending interest rate charged to businesses by commercial banks, 
with a maturity of 3 months to 1 year. The choice of this type of interest rate over the short term 
rate (1 month to 3 months) or long term rate (around 10 years) aims to target medium-term 
investment decision dynamics. A measure of trade openness (TradeOpen), calculated as the sum of 
exports and imports as a % of GDP, is also included. I expect this variable to have an impact 
related to the contribution of international exchange to the ease and pace of innovation and 
technological progress. This variable has been included in previous studies and tested as one 
amongst the most relevant determinants of innovative investment (Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 
2010).  Finally, this vector also contains ExchRate, the nominal exchange rate level, together with 
the interaction between the latter and an EMU dummy, which takes the value of one only for those 
countries which joined the European Monetary Union (EMU), in the year they switched currency 
regime. The level variable is meant to take into account the impact of a currency 
appreciation/depreciation on the level of innovative investment performed. Such indirect impact 
would be brought about by changes in export and/or import patterns, to which the considerations on 
TradeOpen also apply. The interaction, instead, controls for the structural break taking place when 
the EMU regime is adopted, by correcting for the switch in measurement units.
12
 
 
                                            
11 Its square, IntRateSq, is also included to capture potential non-linear effects. 
12 Most EMU countries in my sample joined the currency union in 1999; the rest between 2001 and 2007. When the 
switch takes place, LCU denominated exchange rates turn to euro denominations. The EMU dummy takes into account 
the break to avoid biasing the estimation. 
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3.1 VOLATILITY VECTOR: VARIABLES AND CONSTRUCTION 
 
        Finally, theVm,it vector contains measures of real, monetary, and political instability which 
proxy for the overall soundness of the macroeconomic environment. Specifically, the Vm,it vector 
contains: a measure of overall government deficit/surplus, named Balance. Balance proxies for the 
quality of public account management. While, strictly speaking, this does not represent a 
coefficient of instability, it does give a measure of fiscal reliability, and it has been used in other 
studies in the same way (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Fisher, 1993). PolInstab is an indicator of 
political and institutional stability named ‘State Fragility Index’ in the Polity IV database. Its score 
is higher for countries where the occurrence of wars, coups d’état and short-lasting political 
regimes is more frequent. The reason for including such measure is that political regime changes 
influence the macroeconomic environment as a whole, by switching policy, tax and incentive 
regimes; and by shifting around economic targets and priorities at the national level (Fosu, 1992; 
Alesina et al., 1996). Also, more so in developing countries where this happens rather openly, 
corruption and rent-seeking behaviors influence the allocation of resources (Alesina et al., 1996): if 
the group/coalition in power changes, the whole network of interactions, resource allocation and 
power relations can change, thereby bringing an abrupt alteration in investment profitability and 
opportunities. The vector also includes measures of real and monetary volatility, which have been 
constructed using the coefficient of variation of real interest rate (IntRateCoV), exchange rate 
(ExchRateCoV), and GDP per capita (LogGDPCoV). The volatility of the interest rate, along with 
that of the exchange rate, is used to proxy for the volatility of the monetary policy framework. In 
particular, variability in the interest rate influences the cost of capital; whereas fluctuations in the 
exchange rate affect the export/import incentives of firms. The volatility of the exchange rate is 
also used to proxy for the level of international volatility. In particular, this is meant to capture the 
fact that a great part of the innovation performed in developing countries is not sold domestically. 
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The interaction between nominal exchange rate volatility and the EMU dummy 
(ExchRateCoVEmu) is meant to capture the increased stability that the introduction of the common 
currency has introduced in the nominal exchange rate. Finally, the volatility of GDP per capita is 
intended to proxy the instability in the real sector of the economy and the variability in the level of 
overall savings and aggregate demand.  
 
A great part of the literature agrees now on the coefficient of variation (C.o.V.) being a more robust 
indicator with respect to the standard deviation; as not only the latter is an absolute measure, but it 
also is very sensitive to noise in the data (see Mobarak, 2005; Klomp & de Haan, 2009). To the 
contrary, the division by the mean implied by the C.o.V. creates a discounted relative measure, 
which allows to take into account co-movements between similar countries, due for example to the 
effect of common business cycle patterns (Klomp & de Haan, 2009).
13
 Nonetheless, there is still 
much controversy as to which of the two measures is more appropriate. For this reason, I test the 
results’ robustness using the C.o.V. first, and, then, the standard deviation. Macroeconomic 
volatility does not enter the regression specification in lagged form because it is unlikely that such 
a small component of GDP such as innovative investment financed by the domestic private sector 
can cause real, monetary, and/or political instability.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
 The benchmark regression reported in equation (1) is estimated in its basic, more parsimonious, 
form first and then in its extended form when all volatility indices are included. The results of the 
FE estimator are reported in Table 2, while the results of the 2SLS - FE estimator appear in Table 
3. Starting with column (1) of Table 2, the most basic regression specification estimated includes: 
                                            
13 Appendix B contains the technical details on the construction of these volatility indicators.  
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GDP per capita and its HI interaction, public R&D, the interest rate and its square, the exchange 
rate and its EMU interaction, trade openness and budget deficit. Subsequently, moving  from left to 
right to the next columns, real volatility, monetary volatility and political instability indices are 
added one at a time in each set of results. Column (5) appears in bold type because it reports the 
benchmark regression specification as detailed in equation (1). 
 
[Table 2 about here]  
 
As visible in Table 2, the non-interacted level of development is never significant, regardless of the 
regression specification, whereas LogGDPhi takes on the expected positive sign. One possible 
interpretation of this result is that the level of a country’s GDP per capita is relevant in explaining 
private innovate investment only after a certain threshold value of economic development. 
GoverR&D also has a positive sign which points in the direction of a complementary rather than a 
crowding out effect of public R&D. This result confirms the findings of Becker and Pain (2003) 
and Sameti et al. (2010). The real interest rate shows a negative but diminishing effect on 
innovative investment. This is to be expected if the interest rate is taken to represent the cost of 
borrowing capital by private enterprises. The level of the nominal exchange rate as well as its 
interaction with the EMU dummy are never significant. I can anticipate that this is also the case for 
the volatility of the exchange rate and the interaction term of the latter with EMU, as shown in 
column (4) and (5). The degree of openness to trade has a positive and significant impact on 
BusinessR&D at the 10% level of significance. This result is in line with both the empirical 
literature (Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 2010; Wang, 2010) and the theoretical literature (Porter, 
1990; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) that shows how international openness is likely to result in a 
positive impact on technological progress, due to increased external exposure and interaction. 
Turning to the examination of the instability indicators, Balance has a positive impact on 
14 
 
BusinessR&D, which indicates that a positive relationship between improved fiscal performance 
and innovative investment exist in the sample considered.  The magnitude of this impact increases 
when moving from left to right in Table 2. Moving the focus now to the C.o.V. macro-volatility 
indices, column (2) reports the results of the inclusion of real volatility only. LogGDPCoV enters 
the regression with a negative sign, as expected. Its coefficient increases in both significance and 
magnitude as more volatility indices get added. Both the monetary volatility index, IntRateCoV,.
14
 
and the political instability index, PolInstabI also enter the regression with a negative coefficient. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 All these results remain substantially the same in the 2SLS-FEs estimation (Table 3). The lack of 
significance of LogGDPpc carries over, as well as the strong positive impact that the level of 
development has on private R&D spending when interacted with HI. The one result that is 
cconsiderably different is the increased magnitude of GoverR&D’s coefficient. In particular, the 
coefficient on public R&D in the benchmark regression specification in column (5) indicates that a 
1% point increase in GoverR&D will lead to an increase in private R&D spending of 0.82% points. 
This is a non-trivial impact if one considers that the average private spending in R&D in the 
developing countries subsample of this study is of about 1.12% of their GDP (see Table 1). The 
impact of the interest rate, that of the exchange rate and that of its interaction with EMU carry over 
from Table 2. The same stands for the impact of ExchRateCoV and its interaction term 
ExchRateEMU. Note that the lack of significance of such variables is common in the literature; 
where much of the evidence on the relationship between exchange rate regimes and export volumes 
is rather inconclusive (see Wang and Barrett, 2007 for a review). TradeOpen, on the other hand, 
                                            
14 A quantitative interpretation of the C.o.V. indices is given in the next paragraph, when the results of the 2SLS-FE 
preferred estimation technique are described. 
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appears to have again a positive impact on private innovation. In this panel, a 1% point increase in 
trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports over total GDP, leads to an increase of 
about 0.2% points in BusinessR&D. The coefficient of Balance confirms the importance of the 
quality of the macroeconomic environment for private innovative undertakings, although the actual 
impact size in this sample is not big. The estimate suggests that a 1% point increase in surplus (or 
decrease in deficit) leads to a 0.02% point increase in innovation spending. Coming to the macro-
instability indicators, the results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the coefficient of 
variation of output results in a very sizable decrease of about 20% points in private R&D spending. 
It is easier to appreciate the magnitude of this impact if one considers that the value of 
BusinessR&D in this sample ranges between a minimum of 0.000028% and a maximum of 3.40% 
of GDP (Table 1). In the case of monetary volatility, one standard deviation increase in the C.o.V. 
of IntRateCoV leads to a decrease of 1.2% points in BusinessR&D. These results are in line with 
the findings of the microeconometric literature reported above (Rafferty, 2003a; Aghion et al., 
2008; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009), which also identify a negative impact 
of both real and monetary volatility on the R&D spending financed by the firms considered in their 
panels. Finally, PolInstab appears with a very similar coefficient to the one estimated using simple 
FE. Here, a 1 point increase in political instability - as measured by Polity IV’s “State Failure 
Index”, which ranges from 0 to 21 - leads to a 2.7% points decrease in BusinessR&D, again a non-
trivial impact. This type of relationship is in line with the results of Barro (1991), Fosu (1992), 
Alesina et al. (1996), and Fosu (2003), who show empirically that a negative relation exists 
between political instability and economic growth. My results also reflect the arguments put 
forward by Rodrik (1989) and by Fanelli and Frenkel (1995), who warn that the biggest risk 
implied by political instability spells lays in their recurrence. In fact, the latter leads economic 
agents to change expectations and behaviors as a response. In particular, Rodrik (1989) argues that 
expectations are based on the subjective probability attached to policy reversal and on the 
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magnitude of investment irreversibility. The former is very high in developing countries, while the 
latter is very high for the case of R&D investment. Such combination is likely to be the underlying 
factor behind the detrimental impact that political instability has on BusinessR&D in my findings.  
 
        It has to be emphasised that all volatility measures, with the exception of the exchange rate 
volatility index, appear in the result set with robustly negative coefficients. Moreover, their 
significance is increased by the addition of new volatility indices and they retain their significance 
across the specification sets despite the inclusion of time controls, which are used to correct for the 
effect of both common shocks and the business cycle. As a final remark, note that the Anderson 
LM statistic for the under-identification test always rejects the null of under-identification. More 
importantly, the Wald F statistic used to test for weak identification takes a value of around 10 in 
all regressions of Table 3. Such value conforms to the rule of thumb according to which a statistics 
of 10 is enough to consider weak identification not an issue in the panel. This represents an 
important concern to address because, if instruments are weak, 2SLS may result in standard errors 
which are too small. Finally, a Sargan statistic for the test of over-idintification is not reported 
because my regression is exactly identified. 
 
5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
To check the robustness of my findings, I, first, substitute the standard deviation to the coefficient 
of variation for all volatility indicators . Secondly, I include a number of additional controls in 
order to verify whether the C.o.V. measures retain the same impact. Finally, I use a sample of high-
income countries only, to examine the differential impact of volatility in a sample with higher level 
of economic development. This is done because high-income countries are likely to exhibit lower 
financial constraints, better developed financial markets, improved ability to cope with volatility on 
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the part of the private sector, or even the capacity of the private sector to benefit from such 
fluctuations. As anticipated, the latter hypothesis has been put forward by part of the literature 
reported above (Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983; Dehn, 2000; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993) and by 
Schumpeter-inspired creative destruction theories (Hall, 1991; Saint-Paul, 1993). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
        Starting with the model where the standard deviation has been substituted to the C.o.V. in 
column (1) of Table 4, the results show that both LogGDPpc and LogGDPpcHI are significant, 
albeit of different sign. This points in the direction of a negative effect which very low levels of 
development bear on private innovative investment. Public sector spending in R&D retains its 
positive coefficient, confirming its complementary role. All the results previously reported with 
regards to the interest rate, its square, the exchange rate and its EMU interaction term, TradeOpen, 
and Balance remain intact. Although this result may not be considered as robust, when 
international volatility is measured with the standard deviation, ExchRateStDev gains explanatory 
power
15
. Suh finding seems counter-intuitive at first, as it suggests that a depreciation will decrease 
innovative investment.
16
 This can, however, be interpreted to represent the import-intensive nature 
of innovation in a great part of the countries in my sample. In other words, lower purchasing power 
will result in decreased input imports and R&D investment. Both LogGDPStDev and IntRateStDev, 
instead, retain their significance and negative sign, even though the magnitude of both coefficients 
                                            
15 as opposed to ExchRateCoV 
16 For some similar evidence of a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on agricultural productivity, see Barrett et 
al. (2006). For evidence of a positive relation between exchange rate volatility and overall fixed investment, see Escaleras 
and Thomakos (2008).  
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coefficients is now smaller when compared to the results of column (5) in Table 3. PolInstab, 
instead, retains its significance and appears with a slightly increased coefficient magnitude. 
 
        Moving now to column (2) of Table 4, I present the set of results deriving from the inclusion 
of a number of additional regressors. Democracy is taken from Polity IV, and its score ranges from 
10 (very democratic countries) to 0 (autocratic regimes). The fact that it appears to be 
insignificantly different from zero could be indicating that political instability is a more important 
factor than the institutional background  in explaining investors’ confidence and willingness to 
fund innovation projects. Specifically, the degree of democracy vs. autocracy could be related 
either positively or negatively to R&D investment. However, what is more likely to impact the 
undertaking and continuation of long-term, high-budget projects is the instability in the alternation 
of democracy over autocracy and vice versa, as well as the probability of discontinuation of public 
policies. In addition to Democracy, a measure of property rights protection is also included; which 
is an index constructed by Economic Freedom of the World (EFW). This control is added to test 
whether physical and intellectual property right security has any impact on the amount of 
innovation investment funded by the business sector. The insignificance of this measure in my 
sample is a debatable result; nonetheless, Wang’s (2010) analysis of the determinants of fixed 
investment confirms it. Finally, the amount of high-tech exports as a percentage of overall GDP has 
also been included, and it has been instrumented with its second lag to account for its likely 
endogeneity. I would expect the quantity of high-tech exports to be positively related to the amount 
of innovation performed by the exporting country. However, once again, this control appears with 
an insignificant coefficient. The result could be due to the fact that not all countries where a high 
percentage of high-tech exports is recorded do actually invest more in innovation. In many cases,
17
 
it is rather outsourcing, Export Protection Zone agreements, and the like what accounts for the high 
                                            
17 e. g. Mexico, Costa Rica and many others 
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volumes of high value added exports. As a result, the relationship between HighTechExp and 
BusinessR&D can be blurry, something which is reflected in my own findings. With regards to the 
impact these additional control variables have had on my volatility measures, it is possible to see 
from column (2) of Table 4 that their significance has not been altered following the inclusion of 
these new regressors. 
          
Finally, column (3) reports the results of the benchmark regression estimated on a panel of OECD 
economies. This reduced panel covers a longer period: 28 years, from 1981 to 2008. It counts 22 
countries and sums up to 321 observations. As anticipated, this is done in order to estimate the 
impact of volatility conditional on the different development level attained by this high-income 
group of countries. The results shown in Column (3) lend some support to the findings of the 
literature that posits the pro-cyclicality of innovative investment (see Saint-Paul, 2003). In 
particular, the positive coefficient exhibited by real volatility represent some mild evidence (it is 
only significant at the 10% level) of the Schumpeterian creative destruction argument. On the 
contrary, the monetary volatility index retains its negative impact, probably because financial 
markets’ responsiveness is much more flexible. The positive sign exhibited by the level of real 
interest rate, instead, seems puzzling at first. However, in light of the fact that this panel is very 
homogeneous and that in developed countries the risk attached to investment is much lower, this 
result can be interpreted to represent the rate of return on investment projects. A new indicator of 
political instability, Xconst, measures the degree of constraints put on the executive at the 
institutional level.
18
 This Polity IV variable attaches a higher score to more democratic countries, 
and a score of zero to autocratic regimes. The variable appears to be insignificant in the sample 
considered. Similarly, the level of personal income loses explanatory power and this is likely to be 
                                            
18 PolInstab cannot be used in this regression due to the different time coverage of the HI sample. As already mentioned, 
the HI panel starts in 1981, whereas the ‘State Fragility Index’ by Polity IV only covers the years from 1994 onwards. 
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due to the much more homogenous range of GDP per capita levels in this panel. An interesting 
result is the fact that, even in this sample, the amount of public R&D financed by the government 
retains a positive impact on BusinessR&D. TradeOpen is not included due to the fact that all high-
income countries in this panel are internationally open to the same degree. Balance turns 
insignificant, which is potentially explained by the higher confidence investors place in the public 
finances of developed countries. ExchRate now has a positive impact on BusinessR&D. While its 
coefficient is not very high in economic terms, its significance lends mild evidence to the familiar 
dynamic whereby export expansions follow currency depreciations.  
 
 
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has studied the impact of macroeconomic instability on private innovative investment in 
the form of R&D. The innovation of the paper has been fourfold. Firstly, a focus on the second 
moment of the business cycle has been used, whereby the impact of volatility on innovation is 
analysed rather than simply that of recessions. Secondly, a macroeconometric approach has been 
adopted; thirdly a comprehensive mixed developed-developing economies panel has been 
constructed. Finally, indices of real, monetary, and political instability have been tested according 
to various econometric and economic specifications. This analysis makes it is possible to detangle 
the specific impact of each type of volatility component and the negative impact the latter have on 
private R&D spending has been shown to be not only robust, but also insensitive, to the inclusion 
of additional controls and to changes in the measurement procedure.  
 
        It has been argued that lack of private R&D is likely to result in low levels of growth. The 
question of why the domestic private sector of developing countries is neglecting innovation and 
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failing to reap its high investment returns has been asked at the outset. Innovation has been 
classified as a high-budget, long maturity horizon type of investment. Due to these features, 
uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment has been suggested as a potential answer for the 
lack of private R&D engagement exhibited by most developing countries in my sample.  As 
mentioned above, the econometric findings reported in this paper support such hypothesis and 
suggest three ways in which macro-volatility can affect R&D investment. In particular, political 
instability, real volatility and monetary volatility are shown to have a negative impact on the share 
of R&D financed by the domestic business sector in a mixed panel of 48 countries.  
 
        The above results highlight the need for counter-cyclical technology policy interventions 
aiming to prevent the avoidance and/or abandonment of R&D investment by developing countries’ 
domestic firms. Vidal (2008) reports in her study of the entrepreneurial sector in Latin America that 
half of the businesses in the region fails to survive the set-up phase, and shows how abandonment 
of investment projects is as important a problem as the avoidance of investment altogether. Rodrik 
(1989) shows in his calculations that when investment irreversibility amounts to three-quarters of 
the cost of installed capital, a 20% investment reversal probability due to instability calls for a 15% 
public investment subsidy. The latter is needed to offset the losses due to uncertainty and it is 
necessary to keep alive both the investment profitability and the incentive to innovate. In 
conclusion, while identifying the most appropriate policy tool to tackle these issues is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the policy implication which is possible to draw from this study is that if 
avoidance and/or abandonment of innovative projects are to be prevented in the face of uncertainty, 
policy interventions should follow a counter-cyclical pattern. In other words, they should aim at 
smoothing out downturns and at providing complementary infrastructure and R&D spending when 
negative shocks hit. This would guarantee a continuity of cash flows and return opportunities over 
time to firms engaging in innovation in unstable macroeconomic environments. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
I. DATA SOURCES 
 
 
BUSINESS R&D 
R&D spending financed by the private 
sector as a % of ToT R&D 
  OECD.Stat MSTI Database (2010) 
UNESCO UIS (2010) 
RICYT (2009) 
GOVERNMENT R&D 
 R&D spending financed by the public 
sector as a % of ToT R&D 
  
 OECD.Stat MSTI Database (2010) 
UNESCO UIS (2010) 
RICYT (2009) 
REAL INTEREST RATE Lending Interest Rate minus Inflation Rate Own calculation 
 
OFFICIAL EXCHANGE 
RATE 
Nominal Exchange Rate (LCU per US$) 
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
IMF (IFS, 2010) 
 
BALANCE  
 
Overall Deficit/Surlpus (%GDP) 
 
IMF  (GFS, 2009) 
TRADEOPEN 
 
(Exports + Imports) / GDP 
 
   World Bank-WDI (2010) 
DEMOCRACY 
0-10 Index, authoritarian regimes score 0 
 
POLITY IV Dataset (2010) 
STATE FRAGILITY  
INDEX 
It takes the value of 21 for very unstable 
political environments and 0 for very 
stable ones 
 
POLITY IV Dataset (2009) 
 
XCONST 
 
0-7 Index for institutional constraints on 
the executive, dictatorships score 0 
 
POLITY IV Dataset (2010) 
 
HIGH-TECH EXPORTS 
 
High-Tech Exp/ Tot manufacturing Exp 
 
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
PROTECTION INDEX 
1-7 Index with 1 indicating property rights 
are very well protected  
 
Economic Freedom of the  World 
(2010) 
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II. COUNTRY LIST 
Argentina Denmark** Israel** Norway** South Africa 
Australia** Estonia* Italy ** Panama Spain** 
Austria** Finland ** Korea Rep.** Paraguay Sweden** 
Belgium** France** Kuwait Philippines Switzwerland** 
Bolivia Germany** Latvia* Poland* Thailand 
Brazil Greece** Lithuania Portugal** Uganda 
Bulgaria Hungary* Malaysia Romania Ukraine 
Canada** Iceland** Malta* Russia United Kingdom** 
China 
Colombia 
Cyprus* 
Czech Rep* 
India 
Iran 
Ireland** 
 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Netherlands** 
 
Singapore* 
Slovak Rep* 
Slovenia* 
 
United States** 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
*High-Income countries (ATLAS classification) ** OECD economies included in the robustness analysis panel 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
The Coefficient of Variation (C.o.V.) is calculated across a two year rolling window; its measure is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the rolling window. A backward 
looking strategy has been used
19
 to reflect the type of knowledge agents might have of volatility at 
time t, which is attained by comparing the volatility levels prevailed at time t-1 with those of time t. 
The standard deviation is calculated according to the following formula:   
 
  √
 
   
∑      ̅  
 
                                                   (2) 
Whereas the C.o.V. is obtained as: 
    ⁄  
 
Where σ is the standard deviation as defined in (2) and µ is the mean calculated across a two-year 
rolling window. 
                                            
19 i.e. volatility for year 2001 is calculated across the two year period 2000-1; that of 2002 uses 2001-2, etc. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV. MIN MAX OBS. 
BUSINESSR&D 0.674    0.7     0.000028  3.40 585 
GOVERR&D 0.45      0.25   0.02   1.18 542 
GDPPC 12525  11632 193.5 56639 811 
GDPPCHI 11030 12382 2271.3 56639 811 
INTRATE 9.7  12.7 0.128 130.7 680 
EXCHRATE 288 985.7 0.03 11786 815 
BALANCE   -0.88 4 -21.5 23.4 578 
TRADEOPEN 0.9 0.62 0.15 4.38 803 
POLINSTABILITY 4.7 5.2 0 21 741 
LOGGDPCOV 0.3 0.26 0.0002 2.79 812 
INTRATECOV 0.52 2.2 0.0005 45.9 675 
EXCHRATECOV 0.06 0.09 0 0.84 815 
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Table 2. 
     FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOGGDPt-2 -0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.088 
(0.19) 
-0.09 
(0.2) 
-0.3 
(0.23) 
LOGGDPHIt-2 0.59*** 
(0.18) 
0.52*** 
(0.18) 
0.45** 
(0.2) 
0.44** 
(0.21) 
0.52** 
(0.21) 
GOVERR&Dt-2 0.21** 
(0.11) 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.24** 
(0.12) 
0.24** 
(0.12) 
INTRATE -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
INTRATE
2 0.00005* 
(0.00003) 
0.00006** 
(0.00003) 
0.00008** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007** 
(0.00003) 
0.00007** 
(0.00003) 
EXCHRATE - 0.0001 
(0.00008) 
- 0.00008 
(0.00008) 
- 0.00008 
(0.00008) 
-0.00007 
(0.00008) 
-0.00007 
(0.00008) 
EXCHRATEEMU - 0.02 
(0.03) 
- 0.03 
(0.03) 
- 0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.026 
(0.043) 
-0.018 
(0.043) 
TRADEOPEN 0.1 
(0.08) 
0.13* 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.183* 
(0.09) 
0.186* 
(0.1) 
BALANCE 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.1* 
(0.05) 
-0.13** 
(0.06) 
-0.16* 
(0.06) 
-0.18*** 
(0.06) 
INTRATECOV   -0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.0137** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
EXCHRATECOV    0.06 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU    -0.003 
(0.23) 
-0.07 
(0.23) 
POLINSTAB     -0.026* 
(0.013) 
N. Obs. 319 319 314 293 293 
N. Groups 57 57 57 53 53 
R
2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.25 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on FE. Column (5) corresponds to the specification 
described in equation (1).  
 *** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
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Table 3. 
         2SLS – FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOGGDPt-2 -0.22 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(0.18) 
-0.18 
(0.19) 
-0.41 
(0.26) 
LOGGDPHI t-2 0.57*** 
(0.18) 
0.47*** 
(0.173) 
0.44** 
(0.17) 
0.44** 
(0.18) 
0.51*** 
(0.17) 
GOVERR&D t-2 0.64* 
(0.34) 
0.73** 
(0.35) 
0.75** 
(0.35) 
0.79** 
(0.38) 
0.82** 
(0.37) 
INTRATE -0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
  -0.006** 
(0.002) 
    -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
INTRATE
2 0.00004** 
(0.00002) 
0.00006*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
EXCHRATE -0.00008 
(0.0001) 
-0.00006 
(0.0001) 
-0.00005 
(0.0001) 
-0.00006 
(0.0001) 
-0.00005 
(0.0001) 
EXCHRATEEMU -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
-0.006 
(0.03) 
0.0004 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.04) 
TRADEOPEN 0.097 
(0.07) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.213** 
(0.094) 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
BALANCE 0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.175*** 
(0.06) 
-0.206*** 
(0.06) 
-0.21*** 
(0.065) 
INTRATECOV   -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
EXCHRATECOV    0.1 
(0.136) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU    -0.013 
(0.18) 
-0.034 
(0.17) 
POLINSTAB     -0.027* 
(0.016) 
N. Obs. 313 313 307 288 288 
N. Groups 51 51 50 48 48 
R
2 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.346 
Wald F  11.2 10.8 10.8 9.4 9.4 
Anderson LM stat 32.1 31 31 28 27.9 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on 2SLS-FE. Column (5) corresponds to the 
specification described in equation (1).  
*** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
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Table 4. 
                               2SLS – FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOGGDP t-2 -0.57** 
(0.25) 
-0.52** 
(0.26) 
0.18 
(0.2) 
LOGGDPHI t-2 0.6*** 
(0.17) 
0.47** 
(0.2) 
 
GOVERR&D t-2 0.7** 
(0.35) 
0.82** 
(0.4) 
0.8*** 
(0.13) 
INTRATE -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
INTRATE
2 0.00008*** 
(0.00003) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
EXCHRATE 0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.00001 
(0.00007) 
0.0003** 
(0.00008) 
EXCHRATEEMU -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(0.15) 
TRADEOPEN 0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.3*** 
(0.1) 
 
BALANCE 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.27*** 
(0.07) 
0.22* 
(0.14) 
INTRATECOV  -0.1*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
EXCHRATECOV  0.2 
(0.14) 
-0.3 
(0.27) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU  -0.12 
(0.2) 
0.23 
(0.7) 
POLINSTAB -0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.16) 
 
XCONST   0.1 
(0.01) 
LOGGDPSTDEV -0.017*** 
             (0.6) 
  
 
INTRATESTDEV             -0.005* 
             (0.003) 
  
 
EXCHRATESTDEV            -0.001** 
(0.0004) 
  
 
EXCHRATESTDEVEMU   0.007 
(0.0005) 
  
DEMOCRACY  0.001 
(0.01) 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS   0.007 
(0.01) 
 
33 
 
HIGHTECHEXP t-2  0.006 
(0.005) 
 
N. Obs. 308 280 336 
N. Groups 30 48 22 
R
2
 0.35 0.34 0.89 
Wald F stat 9.5 4.3 243 
Anderson LM stat 28.2 18.2 82.5 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on 2SLS-FE. Column (5) corresponds to the 
specification described in equation (1).  
*** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
 
